Beijing is preparing the economy and technology for a rapid transition to military rails

China has updated legal mechanisms for defense mobilization, strengthening requirements for the readiness of industry, technology companies and civilian infrastructure to work for defense needs. On August 28, 2026, the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress adopted a new version of the National Defense Mobilization Law of the People's Republic of China. On the same day, the President of the People's Republic of China, Xi Jinping, promulgated it by Decree No. 83. The law enters into force on October 1, 2026, according to the Supreme People's Court of the People's Republic of China, which published the text of the decree.

The document contains 14 chapters and 82 articles. The previous edition was adopted on February 26, 2010, it entered into force on July 1 of the same year and included 72 articles. So, we are talking about a comprehensive revision of the law 16 years after its adoption. At the same time, as of September 10, 2026, the new provisions have not yet entered into force.

The reform is of significant importance for assessing China's defense potential. It connects military needs with civilian manufacturing, digital infrastructure and supply chain capabilities. However, its content requires a precise interpretation: some of the described mechanisms existed before, and the very fact of the adoption of the law does not indicate the announcement of mobilization.

What has really changed in the law

As follows from the 2010 edition and the official comparative table published by the defense mobilization authorities of the PRC on August 31, 2026, the previous law already regulated the transfer of enterprises to military production, strategic reserves, the involvement of citizens in defense works, the requisition of civilian resources and the special management of certain industries.

Therefore, the statement that Beijing has only now moved from the mobilization of military personnel to the mobilization of the economy exaggerates the novelty of the reform. It is more precise to talk about the detailing and technological renewal of the long-established system.

The new edition directly defines the concept of defense mobilization in this law for the first time by ensuring a quick transition from a peaceful to a military regime and the transformation of economic and social opportunities into defense capability. "Development interests" have also been added to the list of protected interests. These changes are reflected in articles 1, 2 and 13.

The responsibility of authorities for preparation, assessment of mobilization capacity and relevance of information about available resources has been strengthened separately. As reported by the representative of the Legislative Work Commission of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, Huang Haihua, during the presentation of the changes in August, the key tasks of the review included clarification of the concept of mobilization, the development of new technological directions, and the definition of obligations to provide statistical data.

For the economy, this means strengthening pre-planning: the state seeks to better understand which enterprises, specialists and production lines can be involved, which materials are needed for this, and where restrictions will arise.

"Economic mobilization begins long before the announcement of emergency measures - with capacity accounting, personnel training and supply chain checks. China is trying to shorten the time between a political decision and its implementation by industry. It is the ability to quickly organize production, repair and supply that will determine the stability of the state in a long conflict," said Maksym Urakin, founder of the Experts Club information and analytical center.

Technology and data are becoming a separate mobilization resource

Article 7 of the new edition provides for a system of providing defense mobilization with data, and Article 8 - the application of advanced technologies and the development of relevant forces in new areas. According to the official text of the law published by the Beijing Defense Mobilization Administration, the lawmaker also establishes requirements for information protection.

These articles do not list specific technologies — artificial intelligence, quantum computing, or biotechnology. Their possible use is an analytical interpretation of general norms. Instead, data and software are directly named among the resources that must be reserved by enterprises with defined mobilization tasks.

The practical significance of this change goes beyond the purchase of computers. Industrial production depends on design documentation, equipment management programs, digital models, supplier databases and access to engineering expertise. The loss of such an element can stop production even with the availability of materials and working machines.

Industry will be prepared for expansion of production and repair

According to articles 46-49, state and military authorities must assess the stability of production chains and supply of military products. Designated executors of mobilization tasks must reserve equipment, materials, components, technologies, data and software, prepare technical teams and conduct regular training.

After the decision on mobilization, the relevant enterprises must fulfill military procurement contracts, switch to the necessary products or increase their production. Resource providers should prioritize these tasks. The law provides for the compensation of direct economic losses of performers.

As the official comparison of the two versions of the law shows, reservation of production capacity and priority supply existed earlier. Meaningful additions include chain security assessments, direct integration of data and software, and a requirement for regular training.

China's civilian economy - are there signs of militarization?

According to data from the National Bureau of Statistics of the People's Republic of China released in January 2026, the country's GDP in 2025 was about 140.19 trillion yuan, and real growth was 5% The value added of the manufacturing industry reached approximately 34.7 trillion yuan, or about a quarter of GDP. According to the government of the People's Republic of China, China has retained the world leadership in the scale of processing production.

The statistical communique of the National Bureau of Statistics of the People's Republic of China dated February 28, 2026 specifies the capabilities of the production base:

These indicators cannot be directly translated into the number of missiles, planes or drones. For example, the total output of microchips does not indicate how many of them include high-performance processors or components suitable for a particular military system.

However, the scale of electronics, mechanical engineering and automation expands the possibilities of supplier selection and mass production of components. Research and development spending in 2025 was 2.8% of GDP, according to the same communiqué. This is an indicator of research funding in the entire economy, so it is incorrect to add it to the military budget as a separate defense expenditure.

Automation and batteries strengthen the manufacturing base

According to the International Federation of Robotics in the report World Robotics 2025, during 2024 China installed about 295 thousand industrial robots — 54% of all new installations in the world. The operating fleet exceeded 2 million units, and the share of Chinese suppliers in the domestic market reached 57%.

Robot installation statistics should be distinguished from their production statistics: these are different indicators, in particular, due to exports, imports and the time gap between the manufacture and launch of equipment. A high level of automation can help support mass production, but requires service, electricity and skilled workers.

According to the International Energy Agency's Global EV Outlook 2026, in 2025 China provided approximately 70% of the world's electric vehicle production and more than 80% of battery cell production. Its share in the production of active cathode materials was about 85%, anode materials - more than 90%.

These data explain the concentration of competences in energy storage, power electronics and electric drives. At the same time, the conclusion about their defense value is analytical: a civilian battery or an electric motor does not become a military product without checking the requirements for reliability, temperature regimes and safety of operation.

Shipbuilding is one of the main areas of industry

As reported by the Ministry of Industry and Information of the People's Republic of China, in 2025 Chinese shipyards completed the construction of ships with a total dead weight of 53.69 million tons, which by 11.4% more than a year earlier. China accounted for 56.1% of the world's shipbuilding completions, 69% of new orders and 66.8% of the backlog.

In the first quarter of 2026, construction completions reached 15.68 million dwt, up 46% year-on-year, according to the ministry. China's share in the global result was 57.3%, and the order portfolio at the end of March was 322.3 million tons of deadweight.

Deadweight characterizes the total mass of cargo, fuel, supplies and other loads that a ship can carry. It differs from the tonnage of a warship. So these figures show the scale of the civilian industry, not a direct ratio of military fleets.

For defense mobilization, the availability of shipyards, repair docks, engine and metalwork suppliers, and trained workers matters. However, the transfer of a civilian shipyard to a complex military project requires time, equipment and appropriate documentation. A large portfolio of commercial orders also means that part of the capacity already has commitments to customers.

Strategic reserves: materials, technologies and capacity reserve

The new version of the law provides for strategic reserves with the participation of the state, enterprises and other organizations. According to Articles 40–43, physical stocks of materials, technological reserves and reserve production capabilities are supported. Once mobilization is announced, appropriate storage and transportation resources must prioritize defense needs.

However, industry statistics show the limits of the simple assumption of an unlimited resource. According to the National Bureau of Statistics of the People's Republic of China, the average capacity utilization of industrial enterprises covered by its statistics in 2025 was 74.4%. In the fourth quarter, it was equal to 75.2% for the processing industry, 76% for the automobile industry, and 79.7% for the production of computers, communication devices and other electronics.

The unused part of the capacities does not equal the ready reserve of military production. It can be due to equipment that is not suitable for the required products, or it can be related to a shortage of orders, personnel or materials. Therefore, the mobilization reserve must be evaluated according to specific production processes.

According to the statistical communiqué of the PRC for 2025, the country imported 577.73 million tons of crude oil, 1.259 billion tons of iron ore and concentrate, and 111.83 million tons of soybeans. Such volumes illustrate the dependence of a large production system on international supply. At the same time, the volume of imports for a year does not say anything about the number of days for which strategic reserves will be enough.

China's military budget and its international assessment

As reported by the Ministry of Defense of the People's Republic of China, the national budget for 2026 foresees 1.94 trillion yuan for defense - 6.9% more than the implementation of 2025. Of this amount, 1.91 trillion yuan is accounted for by the central budget, whose growth is 7%.

So, the figures of 6.9% and 7% do not contradict each other: they refer to different budget coverage. The dollar equivalent depends on the exchange rate on the date of conversion, so it is advisable to use yuan for an accurate comparison of the official plan.

The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute provides a separate guideline. According to SIPRI data released on April 27, 2026, China's military spending in 2025 was approximately $336 billion, an increase of 7.4% in real terms. This was the 31st year in a row of growth in Chinese military spending.

For comparison, according to the same methodology, US spending amounted to $954 billion, Russia — $190 billion, Japan — $62.2 billion, Taiwan — $18.2 billion. Calculation based on these estimates shows that the Chinese figure was equal to about 35% of the American figure and exceeded the Japanese figure by 5.4 times.

The SIPRI estimate and the official Chinese budget differ in methodology and coverage. The indicator of $336 billion for 2025 cannot be interpreted as an overachievement of the official plan for 2026. Comparing only in dollars also does not take into account differences in domestic prices, wages and production costs.

Who makes the decision and who can be involved

The decision on general or partial mobilization is made by the Standing Committee of the People's Republic of China, after which the President of the People's Republic of China issues a corresponding decree. The organization of implementation is entrusted to the State Council and the Central Military Commission.

At the same time, Article 14 provides an exception for an immediate threat that requires an immediate response: the government and the military commission can take the necessary mobilization measures with simultaneous notification to the Standing Committee of the People's Liberation Army. Such an emergency mechanism also had a predecessor in the 2010 law.

Men aged 18-60 and women aged 18-55 can join the defense service, with exceptions provided by law. For persons with special professional skills, it is allowed to perform certain tasks outside these age limits. According to articles 57-58, it is about support of the troops, assistance after war destruction and assistance in maintaining public order.

The specified age limits are not new: they were contained in article 49 of the 2010 edition. They should not be submitted as an announcement of a general draft of all citizens of the appropriate age for combat units.

Enterprises of transport, communication, cyber security, medicine, energy, food supply and other specified fields should prepare specialized teams. The involvement of a specific organization depends on its functions and established tasks.

Property and special management of industries

After the decision on mobilization, if the reserves cannot meet the needs in a timely manner, the law allows the forced alienation or temporary use of civilian resources. The property is subject to accounting, and requisitioned resources are subject to return and restoration of functionality after conversion. Direct losses must be compensated.

Protection extends to items necessary for life and living quarters of citizens and families, as well as defined resources of social institutions. This is an important clarification: the law gives no reason to describe the mechanism as an unrestricted seizure of any private property.

Article 73 allows for special treatment in finance, transport, communications, energy, health, food security, trade and the information environment. Restrictions on movements and the priority of transport for the armed forces are also provided for.

At the same time, Article 76 requires the necessity and reasonableness of special measures, their adjustment according to the circumstances and termination after the disappearance of the need. As the comparison of editions shows, the regulation of entire sectors existed before; the reform clarifies its boundaries and procedures.

China's military power in numbers

Open estimates of military equipment lag behind the current state and depend on the calculation methodology. The Pentagon's 2025 report, released on December 23, mainly describes the development of Chinese forces in 2024 and some later developments. It should not be presented as an inventory as of September 2026.

An estimate of approximately 2.035 million active-duty military personnel, 510,000 reservists, and 500,000 paramilitary personnel is provided in the Pentagon's 2024 report. There, the ground troops of the Ukrainian Armed Forces were estimated at 965,000 in 2023. These figures characterize the order of magnitude, and not the actual accounting of all components of the mobilization resource.

Comparison of the tables of the two reports gives the following guidelines:

The table is based on data from the annexes on the military balance in the Taiwan Strait to the corresponding Pentagon reports. Columns with overall Chinese figures are used, not just forces near Taiwan. The difference between estimates may reflect the introduction of equipment, write-offs, reclassifications or accounting adjustments.

Qualitative changes in aviation and navy

According to an estimate by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, presented on February 24, 2026 at the launch of The Military Balance 2026, China received more than 300 stealthy J-20 fighters. The first J-35As, according to the IISS, entered service in 2025. These figures describe deliveries and acceptance into service, not the number of aircraft simultaneously ready for combat sorties.

China also inducted the third aircraft carrier Fujian into the Navy: the ceremony took place on November 5, 2025, according to the Ministry of Defense of the People's Republic of China. The ship is equipped with electromagnetic catapults. Together with the Liaoning and Shandong, it is expanding the development of carrier-based aviation, although the formal introduction of the ship into service is not the same as the completion of the training of its air group.

According to the IISS, during the period 2021-2025, China launched ten nuclear-powered submarines. Launching must be distinguished from completion of trials and acceptance by the Navy: these ten units cannot automatically be added to the previously announced number of boats in service.

The estimate of more than 370 ships and submarines comes from a 2024 Pentagon report. The 395 units listed there for 2025 were a forecast. Therefore, it is better not to use the range "370-400 in 2026" without separate confirmation. The number of platforms in any case does not cover differences in tonnage, weapons, autonomy and experience of crews.

Missile, nuclear and space capabilities

According to the missile armament table in the Pentagon report for 2025, the Chinese arsenal was estimated at about 400 intercontinental ballistic missiles, 550 intermediate-range missiles, 1,300 medium-range missiles range, 900 short-range missiles and 300 land-based cruise missiles.

Together, this is about 3,450 missiles of the specified classes. This is a stockpile estimate, not annual production or number of launchers. Sea and air missiles are not included in this amount. Confusing these categories would create a false impression of the composition and scope of the arsenal.

According to SIPRI data released on June 8, 2026, China's nuclear arsenal at the beginning of the year was estimated at approximately 620 warheads. The institute identifies China as the nation with the fastest expansion of its nuclear arsenal and points to the development of missile mines and new delivery systems.

The number of warheads does not equal the number of deployed missiles or warheads. Nuclear weapons perform primarily a strategic function, so their statistics must be considered separately from conventional forces and the industrial reserve.

For the space component, a more recent Pentagon report calls for more than 500 satellites with reconnaissance capabilities and the launch of 67 such vehicles by 2024. These devices can serve both military and civilian tasks. Therefore, it is about the functional capabilities of the group, and not the purely military affiliation of each satellite.

Does the reform mean preparation for war around Taiwan

The law creates tools for responding to various threats and does not set a date for the start of hostilities. At the same time, it would be incomplete to consider it outside the regional context: Taiwan remains one of the key scenarios of Chinese military planning.

As the Pentagon notes in the 2025 report, the 2027 benchmark is related to the expansion of the PLA's ability to conduct and win the conflict around Taiwan. This is an American assessment of China's goals, which is not evidence of a political decision to attack this year.

China's modernization program also includes 2035 for the basic completion of defense and military modernization and mid-century for building a world-class force. Achieving these benchmarks depends on funding, technology, training, and the ability to coordinate different types of forces.

From an analytical perspective, the new law could increase readiness for a protracted confrontation, including sanctions, supply disruptions, and the need to restore casualties. At the same time, the text of the law itself does not allow determining the probability of a specific war, its duration, or possible outcome.

What does this mean for the world economy and Ukraine

The combination of large civilian production with mobilization mechanisms makes the assessment of Chinese military capabilities more difficult. Production networks, repair, engineering personnel, stockpiled materials and the ability to maintain their interaction during a crisis are important.

For international business, the potential risk is a possible change in supply priorities, logistics loading and component availability. This is a scenario conclusion, not a report on already introduced export restrictions.

For Ukraine, the analytical value of this experience lies in the importance of early accounting of production capabilities, preparation of a repair base, development of interchangeable components and personnel support. The company's ability to fulfill an urgent defense order is determined not only by its nominal capacity, but also by the availability of everything necessary for the production cycle.

“The scale of Chinese industry gives Beijing a significant resource, but resilience is tested by its ability to maintain supplies, energy and specialist jobs. For Ukraine, the practical conclusion is the need to develop production together with repairs, technological reserves and alternative suppliers. It is this kind of preparation that helps to maintain the defense during the long-term burden on the economy," summed up Maksym Urakin, the founder of the Experts Club information and analytical center.