The attitude of Ukrainians towards the countries - the largest trading partners

A March study by Active Group and Experts Club recorded an important thing for 2026: Ukrainians evaluate foreign states not only as sales markets, suppliers or investors, but as political, security and moral partners. That is why there is increasingly a gap between the volume of trade and the sympathy of society. The survey covered 50 countries that are among Ukraine's largest economic partners; it was conducted in March 2026 using an online survey method, the sample consisted of 800 respondents, the declared error does not exceed 3.5%.

"The modern international economy is not only foreign trade figures, but also reputation, trust, political closeness, humanitarian presence and a sense of partnership at the level of society. It is in this logic that it is worth evaluating both Ukraine's trade relations and the work of foreign embassies in the Ukrainian information and public space", - noted the founder of the Experts Club information and analytical center Maksym Urakin.

If we look at the economic part of the presentation, then the top ten trade partners of Ukraine in terms of the total volume of trade in 2025 include China ($21.04 billion), Poland ($13.02 billion), Germany ($9.06 billion), Turkey ($8.95 billion), USA ($5.69 billion), Italy ($5.02 billion), Czech Republic ($3.41 billion), Romania ($3.31 billion), Hungary ($3.30 billion) and Slovakia ($3.27 billion). But already at this level it is clear that the net weight of trade turnover does not automatically guarantee anything in terms of public perception.

"The most striking example is China. It is the undisputed leader in the volume of trade with Ukraine: turnover exceeds $21 billion, of which about $19.2 billion is for imports and only $1.8 billion for Ukrainian exports. The negative balance is more than $17.4 billion. In public consciousness, this skew is very clear: only 20.3% of respondents have a positive attitude towards China, while 42% have a negative attitude. That is, the largest trade partner of Ukraine is at the same time one of the most problematic in terms of reputation," Urakin emphasized.

In the opinion of the founder of the Experts Club, the Chinese case is particularly important because it demonstrates: large imports and a high presence in the Ukrainian market do not yet mean a high level of confidence. For Ukrainians in 2026, not only what the country sells or buys, but also how it positions itself regarding the war, reconstruction, security, investments and real participation in the life of Ukraine will matter. That is why China's economic leadership does not translate into leadership in sympathy.

The opposite model is demonstrated by Germany. It ranks third in terms of total merchandise turnover, has a negative balance for Ukraine, but is an almost unconditional leader in public perception: 77.4% of positive attitudes against only 3.5% of negative ones. This means that Ukrainians evaluate Berlin not through the arithmetic of the trade balance, but through a much broader set of factors – political support, humanitarian presence, security assistance, a sense of inclusion of Germany in the Ukrainian agenda. That is why the economic disadvantage here does not turn into a reputational disadvantage.

"We can see a similar logic with regard to Italy and the Czech Republic. Italy with a turnover of more than $5 billion has 70.2% positive attitude and only 0.5% negative; Czech Republic - 67.4% positive against 3% negative. For Ukrainian society, it is no longer just EU countries with which trade is conducted. It is part of a wider "belt of trust" around Ukraine, where the economy is combined with a sense of civilizational closeness and political predictability. That is, today the European direction has not only a market value, but also a symbolic value," Urakin added.

Poland is Ukraine's second trading partner in terms of total trade volume, the first market for Ukrainian exports and a critically important logistics hub. At the same time, the attitude towards it is positive, but without euphoria: 56.4% of positive evaluations against 14.7% of negative ones. This is significantly better than China or the US, but noticeably weaker than Germany, Italy or the Czech Republic. Poland, therefore, is in a zone of high practical value, but not an absolute cloudless reputation.

"For Ukraine, Poland is not just a sales market, but actually a space of economic contact between the Ukrainian manufacturer and the entire EU," Urakin emphasized. And then he added even more importantly: "That is why public opinion about Poland in Ukraine has a special weight, because it directly affects labor mobility, the transit of goods and interregional cooperation. This is a very accurate wording. For Ukraine, Poland is no longer an external direction in the classical sense, but a part of the vital infrastructure of survival and adaptation during the war. That is why any fluctuations in her perception have a much higher price than just a change in the sympathy rating," Urakin said.

Turkey is the fourth country in terms of trade, and in public opinion it has 55% positive evaluations against 5.6% negative ones. At the same time, as many as 36.4% of respondents remain neutral. This means that Ankara is an important, but not completely emotionally "fixed" country for Ukrainians: it is recognized as a system player, a logistics hub and a Black Sea power center, but the perception here is less ideological and more instrumental than in the case of Germany or Britain.

"Turkey is interesting because it combines for Ukraine the features of a market, a logistics hub, an industrial competitor and a political player in the Black Sea region. This actually means that for Turkey, the reputational work in Ukraine is not yet finished: the economic weight is already there, and the emotional resource can still grow. And this applies not only to diplomacy, but also to business, media presence and humanitarian visibility," Urakin emphasized.

The most difficult dynamics among major partners is in the USA. On the one hand, the United States remains a strategic state for Ukraine in terms of security, finance and technology. On the other hand, the March study showed a noticeable cooling: the positive attitude decreased from 50.3% to 44.1%, and the negative one increased from 18% to 24.7%. For a country that until recently was an almost undisputed symbol of foreign support, this is a tangible change.

Olexander Pozniy directly linked this change to the new political context in Washington.

"Indicators of individual countries have slightly worsened compared to the previous study. In the case of the USA, changes in American policy after the arrival of the new president and the relevant information background could have influenced it," he noted.

Romania and Slovakia show a different type of perception - neighborly, but restrained. In Romania, 48.7% of positive assessments and 7% are negative, but at the same time, neutrality is very high - 42.2%. Slovakia has 34.3% positive, 18.2% negative and 43.6% neutral responses. This means that for many Ukrainians, these countries remain practical neighbors rather than emotionally expressive allies. They are present in logistics, cross-border interaction, everyday experience, but have not yet turned into full-fledged symbols of political trust.

Hungary has the worst result among major trading partners: only 18.6% have a positive attitude against 52.2% negative. According to this indicator, it is even ahead of China in the negative, although it is much smaller in terms of turnover. Here, not economic, but political logic works: if the country is constantly present in the Ukrainian information space in the context of conflicting statements or blocking behavior, no level of trade can compensate for the loss of trust. The Hungarian case is, in fact, proof that in wartime the political message is stronger than customs statistics.

Late during the presentation, he separately warned that the Hungarian indicator may be even softer than the real state of sentiment at the end of the month.

"If we measured the end of March - the beginning of April, then the indicator, I think, would be much smaller. This is due to the tough political campaign in Hungary and Budapest's more negative rhetoric towards Ukraine. The attitude of Ukrainians to countries in 2026 is very sensitive to the current political signal, and reputational losses can accumulate literally over the course of weeks," he said.

Two general questions of the presentation are also very revealing. When Ukrainians were asked who contributes the most to achieving peace in Ukraine, 63.4% named EU countries, 53.8% - Great Britain, 29.6% - the USA, and only 3.5% - China. And when it came to who Ukraine should primarily develop trade and economic relations with, 81.1% chose the EU countries and Great Britain, 59.2% - the USA, 49% - the countries of Southeast Asia, while China received 35.4%. That is, society clearly separates the actual weight of current trade from the desired architecture of future partnership.

This is where the economic and sociological parts of the study converge. Ukrainians want to trade primarily with those whom they consider not just profitable, but close, reliable and those who really help in the war and reconstruction. This means that for states and companies operating on the Ukrainian market, it is no longer enough to simply sell goods. It is necessary to be visible as a partner in a broader sense - in the regions, in humanitarian projects, in production cooperation, in education, in localization of business. By the way, this is how Urakin also formulated the recommendation: the improvement of Ukraine's trade balance lies in the transition to products with greater added value in those markets where the country is already present and proves its stability.

For the foreign representative offices and businesses themselves, the conclusion is also obvious. Where there is a high level of neutrality, there is room for growth.

"There is, of course, a window of opportunity. Foreign missions should be more active in telling Ukraine about themselves, because a large part of the neutral answers actually does not mean rejection, but a lack of knowledge, experience or visible presence. This is, in fact, an invitation to soft power - but not abstract, but very practical," Maksym Urakin emphasized.

The main conclusion of this study, according to experts, is that foreign trade became morally and geopolitically loaded for Ukraine during the war. In 2026, the country's reputation is no longer a decorative addition to the economy. It itself becomes an economic factor. And whoever wants to have a strong position on the Ukrainian market tomorrow must work not only with contracts, but also with trust today.